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Abstract
In many predictive decision-making scenarios,
such as credit scoring and academic testing, a
decision-maker must construct a model that ac-
counts for agents’ propensity to “game” the de-
cision rule by changing their features so as to
receive better decisions. Whereas the strategic
classification literature has previously assumed
that agents’ outcomes are not causally affected by
their features (and thus that strategic agents’ goal
is deceiving the decision-maker), we join concur-
rent work in modeling agents’ outcomes as a func-
tion of their changeable attributes. As our main
contribution, we provide efficient algorithms for
learning decision rules that optimize three distinct
decision-maker objectives in a realizable linear
setting: accurately predicting agents’ post-gaming
outcomes (prediction risk minimization), incen-
tivizing agents to improve these outcomes (agent
outcome maximization), and estimating the coef-
ficients of the true underlying model (parameter
estimation). Our algorithms circumvent a hard-
ness result of Miller et al. (2020) by allowing
the decision maker to test a sequence of decision
rules and observe agents’ responses, in effect per-
forming causal interventions through the decision
rules.
1. Introduction
As individuals, we want algorithmic transparency in deci-
sions that affect us. Transparency lets us audit models for
fairness and correctness, and allows us to understand what
changes we can make to receive a different decision. Why,
then, are some models kept hidden from the view of those
subject to their decisions?
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Beyond setting-specific concerns like intellectual property
theft or training-data extraction, the canonical answer is
that transparency would allow strategic individual agents
to “game” the model. These individual agents will act
to change their features to receive better decisions. An
accuracy-minded decision-maker, meanwhile, chooses a de-
cision rule based on how well it predicts individuals’ true
future outcomes. Strategic agents, the conventional wisdom
goes, make superficial changes to their features that will
lead to them receiving more desirable decisions, but these
feature changes will not affect their true outcomes, reducing
the decision rule’s accuracy and harming the decision-maker.
The field of strategic classification (Hardt et al., 2016) has
until recently sought to design algorithms that are robust
to such superficial changes. At their core, these algorithms
treat transparency as a reluctant concession and propose
ways for decision-makers to get by nonetheless.
But what if decision-makers could benefit from trans-
parency? What if in some settings, gaming could help
accomplish the decision-makers’ goals, by causing agents
to truly improve their outcomes without loss of predictive
accuracy?
Consider the case of car insurance companies, who wish to
choose a pricing decision rule that charges a customer in
line with the expected costs that customer will incur through
accidents. Insurers will often charge lower prices to drivers
who have completed a “driver’s ed” course, which teaches
comprehensive driving skills. In response, new drivers will
often complete such courses to reduce their insurance costs.
One view may be that only ex ante responsible drivers seek
out such courses, and that were an unsafe driver to complete
such a course it would not affect their expected cost of car
accidents.
But another interpretation is that drivers in these courses
learn safer driving practices, and truly become safer drivers
because they take the course. In this case, a car insurer’s de-
cision rule remains predictive of accident probability when
agents strategically game the decision rule, while also in-
centivizing the population of drivers to act in a way that
truly causes them to have fewer accidents, which means the
insurer needs to pay out fewer reimbursements.
This same dynamic appears in many decision settings where
the decision-maker has a meaningful stake in the true future
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Figure 1. A causal graph illustrating that by intervening on the
decision rule ω, a decision-maker can incentivize a change in x,
enabling them to learn about how the agent outcome y is caused.
We omit details of our setting for simplicity.
outcomes of its subject population, including credit scor-
ing, academic testing, hiring, and online recommendation
systems. In such scenarios, given the right decision rule,
decision-makers can gain from transparency.
But how can we find such a decision rule that maximizes
agents’ outcomes if we do not know the effects of agents’
feature-changing actions? In recent work, Miller et al.
(2020) argue that finding such “agent outcome”-maximizing
decision rules requires solving a non-trivial causal inference
problem. As we illustrate in Figure 1, the decision rule
affects the agents’ features, which causally affect agents’
outcomes, and recovering these relationships from observa-
tional data is hard. We will refer to this setting as “causal
strategic learning”, in view of the causal impact of the deci-
sion rule on agents’ outcomes.
The core insight of our work is that while we may not know
how agents will respond to any arbitrary decision rule, they
will naturally respond to any particular rule we pick. Thus,
as we test different decision rules and observe strategic
agents’ responses and true outcomes, we can improve our
decision rule over time. In the language of causality, by
choosing a decision rule we are effectively launching an
intervention that allows us to infer properties of the causal
graph, circumventing the hardness result of Miller et al.
(2020).
In this work, we introduce the setting of causal strategic lin-
ear regression in the realizable case and with norm-squared
agent action costs. We propose algorithms for efficiently op-
timizing three possible objectives that a decision-maker may
care about. Agent outcome maximization requires choos-
ing a decision rule that will result in the highest expected
outcome of an agent who games that rule. Prediction risk
minimization requires choosing a decision rule that accu-
rately predicts agents’ outcomes, even under agents’ gaming
in response to that same decision rule. Parameter estima-
tion involves accurately estimating the parameters of the
true causal outcome-generating linear model. We show that
these may be mutually non-satisfiable, and our algorithms
maximize each objective independently (and jointly when
possible).
Additionally, we show that omitting unobserved yet
outcome-affecting features from the decision rule has major
consequences for causal strategic learning. Omitted variable
bias in classic linear regression leads a learned predictor to
reward non-causal visible features which are correlated with
hidden causal features (Greene, 2003). In the strategic case,
this backfires, as an agent’s action may change a visible fea-
ture without changing the hidden feature, thereby breaking
this correlation, and undermining a navely-trained predic-
tor. All of our methods are designed to succeed even when
actions break the relationships between visible proxies and
hidden causal features. Another common characteristic of
real-life strategic learning scenarios is that in order to game
one feature, an agent may need to take an action that also
perturbs other features. We follow Kleinberg & Raghavan
(2019) in modeling this by having agents take actions in
action space which are mapped to features in feature space
by an effort conversion matrix.
As much of the prior literature has focused on the case of
binary classification, it’s worth meditating on why we focus
on regression. Many decisions, such as loan terms or insur-
ance premiums, are not binary “accept/reject”s but rather
lie somewhere on a continuum based on a prediction of a
real-valued outcome. Furthermore, many ranking decisions,
like which ten items to recommend in response to a search
query, can instead be viewed as real-valued predictions that
are post-processed into an ordering.
1.1. Summary of Results
In Section 2, we introduce a setting for studying the per-
formance of linear models that make real-valued decisions
about strategic agents. Our methodology incorporates the re-
alities that agents’ actions may causally affect their eventual
outcomes, that a decision-maker can only observe a subset
of agents’ features, and that agents’ actions are constrained
to a subspace of the feature space. We assume no prior
knowledge of the agent feature distribution or of the actions
available to strategic agents, and require no knowledge of
the true outcome function beyond that it is itself a noisy
linear function of the features.
In Section 3, we propose an algorithm for efficiently learn-
ing a decision rule that will maximize agent outcomes. The
algorithm involves publishing a decision rule corresponding
to each basis vector; it is non-adaptive, so each decision
rule implemented in parallel on a distinct portion of the
population.
In Section 4, we observe that under certain checkable condi-
tions the prediction risk objective can be minimized using
gradient-free convex optimization techniques. We also pro-
vide a useful decomposition of prediction risk, and suggest
how prediction risk and agent outcomes may be jointly opti-
mized.
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In Section 5, we show that in the case where all features that
causally affect the outcome are visible to the decision-maker,
one can substantially improve the estimate of the true model
parameters governing the outcome. At a high level, this is
because by incentivizing agents to change their features in
certain directions, we can improve the conditioning of the
second moment matrix of the resulting feature distribution.
1.2. Related Work
This paper is closely related to several recent and concurrent
papers that study different aspects of (in our parlance) causal
strategic learning. Most of these works focus on one of our
three objectives.
Agent outcomes. Our setting is partially inspired by
Kleinberg & Raghavan (2019). In their setting, as in ours,
an agent chooses an action vector in order to maximize the
score they receive from a decision-maker. The action vector
is mapped to a feature vector by an effort conversion matrix,
and the decision-maker publishes a mechanism that maps
the feature vector to a score. However, their decision-maker
does not face a learning problem: the effort conversion ma-
trix is given as input, agents do not have differing initial
feature vectors, and there is no outcome variable. Moreover,
there are no hidden features. In a variation on the agent
outcomes objective, their decision-maker’s goal is to incen-
tivize agents to take a particular action vector. Their main
result is that whenever a monotone mechanism can incen-
tivize a given action vector, a linear mechanism suffices.
Alon et al. (2020) analyze a multi-agent extension of this
model.
In another closely related work, Miller et al. (2020) bring a
causal perspective (Pearl, 2000; Peters et al., 2017) to the
strategic classification literature. Whereas prior strategic
classification works mostly assumed agents’ actions have
no effect on the outcome variable and are thus pure gaming,
this paper points out that in many real-life strategic clas-
sification situations, the outcome variable is a descendant
of some features in the causal graph, and thus actions may
lead to genuine improvement in agent outcomes. Their main
result is a reduction from the problem of orienting the edges
of a causal graph to the problem of finding a decision rule
that incentivizes net improvement. Since orienting a causal
graph is a notoriously difficult causal inference problem
given only observational data, they argue that this provides
evidence that incentivizing improvement is hard. In this pa-
per we we point out that improving agent outcomes may not
be so difficult after all because the decision-maker does not
need to rely only on observational data—they can perform
causal interventions through the decision rule.
Haghtalab et al. (2020) study the agent outcomes objective
in a linear setting that is similar to ours. A significant
difference is that, while agents do have hidden features,
they are never incentivized to change their hidden features
because there is no effort conversion matrix. This, combined
with the use of a Euclidean norm action cost (we, in contrast,
use a Euclidean squared norm cost function), makes finding
the optimal linear regression parameters trivial. Hence, they
mainly focus on approximation algorithms for finding an
optimal linear classifier.
Tabibian et al. (2020) consider a variant of the agent out-
comes objective in a classification setting: the outcome is
only “realized” if the agent receives a positive classifica-
tion, and the decision-maker pays a cost for each positive
classification it metes out. The decision-maker knows the
dependence of the outcome variable on agent features a
priori, so there is no learning.
Prediction risk. Perdomo et al. (2020) define performa-
tive prediction as any supervised learning scenario in which
the model’s predictions cause a change in the distribution of
the target variable. This includes causal strategic learning
as a special case. They analyze the dynamics of repeated
retraining—repeatedly gathering data and performing em-
pirical risk minimization—on the prediction risk. They
prove that under certain smoothness and strong convexity
assumptions, repeated retraining (or repeated gradient de-
scent) converges at a linear rate to a near-optimal model.
Liu et al. (2020) introduce a setting where each agent re-
sponds to a classifier by intervening directly on the outcome
variable, which then affects the feature vector in a manner
depending on the agent’s population subgroup membership.
Parameter estimation. Bechavod et al. (2020) study the
effectiveness of repeated retraining at optimizing the pa-
rameter estimation objective in a linear setting. Like us,
they argue that the decision-maker’s control over the deci-
sion rule can be conducive to causal discovery. Specifically,
they show that if the decision-maker repeatedly runs least
squares regression (with a certain tie-breaking rule in the
rank-deficient case) on batches of fresh data, the true param-
eters will eventually be recovered. Their setting is similar
to ours but does not include an effort conversion matrix.
Non-causal strategic classification. Other works on
strategic classification are non-causal—the decision-
maker’s rule has no impact on the outcome of interest. The
primary goal of the decision-maker in much of the classic
strategic classification literature is robustness to gaming;
the target measure is typically prediction risk. Our use of
a Euclidean squared norm cost function is shared by the
first paper in a strategic classification setting (Bru¨ckner &
Scheffer, 2011). Other works use a variety of different cost
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functions, such as the separable cost functions of Hardt
et al. (2016). The online setting was introduced by Dong
et al. (2018) and has also been studied by Chen et al. (2020),
both with the goal of minimizing “Stackelberg regret”.1 A
few papers (Milli et al., 2019; Hu et al., 2019) show that
accuracy for the decision-maker can come at the expense
of increased agent costs and inequities. Braverman & Garg
(2020) argue that random classification rules can be better
for the decision-maker than deterministic rules.
Economics. Related problems have long been studied in
information economics, specifically in the area of contract
theory (Salanie´, 2005; Laffont & Martimort, 2002). In
principal-agent problems (Ho¨lmstrom, 1979; Grossman &
Hart, 1983; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Ederer et al.,
2018), also known as moral hazard or hidden action prob-
lems, a decision-maker (called the principal) faces a chal-
lenge very similar to the agent outcomes objective. Notable
differences include that the decision-maker can only ob-
serve the outcome variable, and the decision-maker must
pay the agent. In a setting reminiscent of strategic classifi-
cation, Frankel & Kartik (2020) prove that the fixed points
of retraining can be improved in terms of accuracy if the
decision-maker can commit to underutilizing the available
information. Ball (2020) introduces a three-party model in
which an intermediary scores the agent and a decision-maker
makes a decision based on the score.
Ethical dimensions of strategizing. Ustun et al. (2019)
and Venkatasubramanian & Alfano (2020) argue that it is
normatively good for individuals subject to models to have
recourse: the ability to induce the model to give a desired
prediction by changing mutable features. Ziewitz (2019)
discusses the shifting boundaries between morally “good”
and “bad” strategizing in the context of search engine opti-
mization.
Other strategic linear regression settings. A distinct lit-
erature on strategic variants of linear regression (Perote &
Perote-Pen˜a, 2004; Dekel et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2018;
Ioannidis & Loiseau, 2013; Cummings et al., 2015) studies
settings in which agents can misreport their y values to max-
imize their privacy or the model’s prediction on their data
point(s).
2. Problem Setting
Our setting is defined by the interplay between two parties:
agents, who receive decisions based on their features, and
a decision-maker, who chooses the decision rule that deter-
1See Bambauer & Zarsky (2018) for a discussion of online
strategic classification from a legal perspective.
mines these decisions.2 We visualize our setting in Figure
2.
hiddenvisible
Outcome	after	Gaming
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Figure 2. Visualization of the linear setting. Each box corresponds
to a real-valued scalar, with value indicated by shading. The two
boxes with dark red outlines represent features that are correlated
in the initial feature distribution P .
Each agent is described by a feature vector x ∈ Rd′ ,3
initially drawn from a distribution P ∈ ∆(Rd′) over
the feature-space with second moment matrix Σ =
Ex∼P
[
xxT
]
. Agents can choose an action vector a ∈ Rk to
change their features from x to xg , according to the follow-
ing update rule: xg = x+Ma where the effort conversion
matrix M ∈ Rd′×k has an (i, j)th entry corresponding to
the change in the ith feature of x as a result of spending
one unit of effort along the jth direction of the action space.
Each action dimension can affect multiple features simul-
taneously. For example, in the context of car insurance, a
prospective customer’s action might be “buy a new car”,
which can increase both the safety rating of the vehicle and
the potential financial loss from an accident. The car-buying
action might correspond to a column M1 = (2, 10000)T , in
which the two entries represent the action’s marginal impact
on the car’s safety rating and cost-to-refund-if-damaged re-
spectively. M can be rank-deficient, meaning some feature
directions cannot be controlled independently through any
action.
Let y be a random variable representing an agent’s true
outcome, which we assume is decomposable into a noisy
linear combination of the features y := 〈ω∗, xg〉+ η, where
ω∗ ∈ Rd′ is the true parameter vector, and η is a subgaus-
sian noise random variable with variance σ. Note that ω∗i
can be understood as the causal effect of a change in feature
i on the outcome y, in expectation. Neither the decision-
2In the strategic classification literature, these are occasionally
referred to as the “Jury” and “Contestant”.
3For simplicity of notation, we implicitly use homogeneous
coordinates: one feature is 1 for all agents. The matrices V and
M , defined in this section, are such that this feature is visible to
the decision-maker and unperturbable by agents.
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maker nor the agent knows ω∗.
To define the decision-maker’s behavior, we must introduce
an important aspect of our setting: the decision-maker never
observes an agent’s complete feature vector xg, but only
a subset of of those features V xg, where V is a diagonal
projection matrix with 1s for the d visible features and 0s
for the hidden features.
Now, our decision-maker assigns decisions 〈ω, V xg〉, where
ω ∈ Rd′ is the decision rule. Note that because the hidden
feature dimensions of ω are never used, we will define
them to be 0, and thus ω is functionally defined in the d-
dimensional visible feature subspace.
For convenience, we define the matrix G = MMTV as
shorthand. (We will see that G maps ω to the movement in
agents’ feature vectors it incentivizes.)
Agents incur a cost C(a) based on the action they chose.
Throughout this work this cost is quadratic C(a) = 12‖a‖22.
This corresponds to a setting with increasing costs to taking
any particular action.
Importantly, we assume that agents will best-respond to the
published decision rule by choosing whichever action a(ω)
maximizes their utility, defined as their received decision
minus incurred action cost:4
a(ω) = arg max
a′∈Rk
[
〈ω, V (x+Ma′)〉 − 12‖a
′‖2
]
(1)
However, to take into account the possibility that not all
agents will in practice study the decision rule to figure out
the action that will maximize their utility, we further assume
that only a p fraction of agents game the decision rule, while
a 1− p fraction remain at their initial feature vector.
Now, the interaction between agents and the decision-maker
proceeds in a series of rounds, where a single round t con-
sists of the sequence described in the following figure:
For round t ∈ {1, . . . , r}:
1. The decision-maker publishes a new decision rule ωt.
2. A new set of n agents arrives: {x ∼ P}n.
Each agent games w.r.t. ωt; i.e. xg ← x+Ma(ωt).
3. The decision-maker observes the post-gaming visible
features V xg for each agent.
Agents receive decisions ωTt V xg .
4. The decision-maker observes the outcome y ∼
ω∗Txg + η for each agent.
4Note that this means that all strategic agents will, for a given
decision rule ω, choose the same gaming action a(ω).
In general, we will assume that the decision-maker cares
more about minimizing the number of rounds required for
an algorithm than the number of agent samples collected in
each round.
We now turn to the three objectives that decision-makers
may wish to optimize.
Objective 1. The agent outcomes objective is the average
outcome over the agent population after gaming:
AO(ω) := Ex∼P,η [〈ω∗, x+Ma(ω)〉+ η] (2)
In subsequent discussion we will restrict ω to the unit `2-
ball, as arbitrarily high outcomes could be produced if ω
were unbounded.
An example of a decision-maker who cares about agent
outcomes is a teacher formulating a test for their students—
they may care more about incentivizing the students to learn
the material than about accurately stratifying students based
on their knowledge of the material.
Objective 2. Prediction risk captures how close the output
of the model is to the true outcome. It is measured in terms
of expected squared error:
Risk(ω) = Ex∼P,η
[(〈ω∗, x+Ma(ω)〉
+ η − 〈ω, V (x+Ma(ω))〉)2] (3)
A decision-maker cares about minimizing prediction risk
if they want the scores they assign to individuals to be as
predictive of their true outcomes as possible. For exam-
ple, insurers’ profitability is contingent on neither over- nor
under-estimating client risk.
In the realizable linear setting, there is a natural third objec-
tive:
Objective 3. Parameter estimation error measures how
close the decision rule’s coefficients are to the visible coeffi-
cients of the underlying linear model:
‖V (ω − ω∗)‖2 (4)
A decision-maker might care about estimating parameters
accurately if they want their decision rule to be robust to
unpredictable changes in the feature distribution, or if knowl-
edge of the causal effects of the features could help inform
the design of other interventions.
Below, we show that these objectives may be mutually non-
satisfiable. A natural question is whether we can optimize a
weighted combination of these objectives. In Section 4, we
outline an algorithm for optimizing a weighted combination
of prediction risk and agent outcomes. Our parameter recov-
ery algorithm will only work in the fully-visible (V = I)
case; in this case, all three objectives are jointly satisfied by
ω = ω∗, though each objective implies a different type of
approximation error and thus requires a different algorithm.
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Figure 3. A toy example in which the objectives are mutually non-
satisfiable. Each ω optimizes a different objective.
2.1. Illustrative example
To illustrate the setting, and demonstrate that in certain cases
these objectives are mutually non-satisfiable, we provide a
toy scenario, visualized in Figure 3. Imagine a car insurer
that predicts customers’ expected accident costs given ac-
cess to three features: (1) whether the customer owns their
own car, (2) whether they drive a minivan, and (3) whether
they have a motorcycle license. There is a single hidden,
unmeasured feature: (4) how defensive a driver they are. Let
ω∗ = (0, 0, 1, 1), i.e. of these features only knowing how
to drive a motorcycle and being a defensive driver actually
reduce the expected cost of accidents. Let the initial data dis-
tribution have “driving a minivan” correlate with defensive
driving (because minivan drivers are often parents worried
about their kids). Let the first effort conversion column
M1 = (1, 0, 0, 2) represent the action of purchasing a new
car, which also leads the customer to drive more defensively
to protect their investment. Let the second action-effect
column M2 = (0, 0, 1,−2) be the action of learning to ride
a motorcycle, which slightly improves the likelihood of safe
driving by conferring upon the customer more understand-
ing how motorcyclists on the road will react, while making
the customer themselves substantially more thrill-seeking
and thus reckless in their driving and prone to accidents.
How should the car insurer choose a decision rule to max-
imize each objective? If the rule rewards customers who
own their own car (1), this will incentivize customers to
purchase new cars and thus become more defensive (good
for agent outcomes), but will cause the decision-maker to be
inaccurate on the (1−p)-fraction of non-gaming agents who
already had their own cars and no more likely to avoid acci-
dents than without this decision rule (bad for prediction risk),
and owning a car does not truly itself reduce expected acci-
dent costs (bad for parameter estimation). Minivan-driving
(2) may be a useful feature for prediction risk because of
its correlation with defensive driving, but anyone buying
a minivan specifically to reduce insurance payments will
not be a safer driver (unhelpful for agent outcomes) nor
does minivan ownership truly cause lower accident costs
(bad for parameter estimation). Finally, if the decision rule
rewards customers who have a motorcycle license (3), this
does reflect the fact that possessing a motorcycle license
itself does reduce a driver’s expected accident cost (good
for parameter estimation), but an agent going through the
process of acquiring a motorcycle license will do more harm
than good to their overall likelihood of an accident due to
the action’s side effects of also making them a less defensive
driver (bad for agent outcomes), and rewarding this feature
in the decision rule will lead to poor predictions as it is
negatively correlated with expected accident cost once the
agents have acted (bad for prediction risk).
The meta-point is that when some causal features are hidden
from the decision-maker, there may be a tradeoff between
the agents’ outcomes, the decision-rule’s predictiveness, and
the correctness of parameters recovered by the regression.
In the rest of the paper, we will demonstrate algorithms for
finding the optimal decision rules for each objective, and
discuss prospects for optimizing them jointly.
3. Agent Outcome Maximization
In this section we propose an algorithm for choosing a
decision rule that will incentivize agents to choose actions
that (approximately) maximally increase their outcomes.
Throughout this section, we will assume that without loss of
generality p = 1 and ||ω?|| = 1. If only a subset of agents
are strategic (p < 1), the non-strategic agents’ outcomes
cannot be affected and can thus be safely ignored.
In our car insurance example, this means choosing a de-
cision rule that causes drivers to behave the most safely,
regardless of whether the decision rule accurately predicts
accident probability or whether it recovers the true parame-
ters.
Let ωmao be the decision rule that maximizes agent out-
comes:
ωmao := arg max
ω∈Rd,‖ω‖2≤1
AO(ω) (5)
Theorem 1. Suppose the feature vector second moment
matrix Σ has largest eigenvalue bounded above by λmax,
and suppose the outcome noise η is 1-subgaussian. Then
Algorithm 1 estimates a parameter vector ωˆ in d+ 1 rounds
with O(−1λmaxd + 1) samples in each round such that
w.h.p.
AO(ωˆ) ≥ AO(ωmao)− .
Proof Sketch. First we note that it is straightforward to com-
pute the action that each agent will take. Each agent max-
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Algorithm 1 Agent Outcome Maximization
Input: λmax, d, 
Let n = 100−1λmaxd
Let {ωj}di=1 be an orthonormal basis for Rd
Sample (x1, y1) . . . (xn, yn) with ω = 0.
Let µˆ = 1n
∑n
j=1 yj
for i = 1 to d do
Sample (x1, y1) . . . (xn, yn) with ω = ωi
Let νˆi = 1n
∑n
j=1 yj − µˆ
end for
Let νˆ = (ωˆ(1)mao, . . . , ωˆ(d)mao)T
Let ωˆ = νˆ/‖νˆ‖
Return ωˆ
imizes ωTV (x + Ma) − 12‖a‖2 over a ∈ Rm. Note that∇a(ωTVMa− 12‖a‖2) = MTV ω − a. Thus,
arg max
a
ωTV (x+Ma)− 12‖a‖
2
= arg max
a
ωTVMa− 12‖a‖
2
= MTV ω
That is, every agent chooses an action such that xg =
x + MMTV ω = x + Gω (recall we have defined G :=
MMTV for notational compactness). This means that if the
decision-maker publishes ω, the resulting expected agent
outcome is AO(ω) = Ex∼P
[
ω∗Tx+ ω∗TGω)
]
. Hence,
ωmao =
GTω∗
‖GTω∗‖2
In the first round of the algorithm, we set ω = 0 and obtain
an empirical estimate of AO(0) = Ex∼P
[
ω∗Tx
]
.5 We
then select an orthonormal basis {ωi}di=1 for Rd. In each
subsequent round, we publish an ωi and obtain an estimate
of AO(ωi). Subtracting the estimate of AO(0) yields an es-
timate of Ex∼P
[
ω∗TGωi
]
, which is a linear measurement
of GTω∗ along the direction ωi. Combining these linear
measurements, we can reconstruct an estimate of GTω∗.
The number of samples per round is chosen to ensure that
the estimate of GTω∗ is within `2-distance at most /2 of
the truth. We set ωˆ to be this estimate scaled to have norm
1. A simple argument allows us to conclude that AO(ωˆ)
is within an additive error of  of AO(ωmao). We leave a
complete proof to the appendix.
This algorithm has several desirable characteristics. First,
the decision-maker who implements the algorithm does not
5Alternatively, the decision-maker could run this algorithm but
with all parameter vectors shifted by some ω.
need to have any knowledge of M or even of the number
of hidden features d′ − d. Second, the algorithm is non-
adaptive, in that the published decision rule in each round
does not depend on the results of previous rounds. Hence,
the algorithm can be parallelized by simultaneously apply-
ing d separate decision rules to d separate subsets of the
agent population and simultaneously observing the results.
Finally, by using decision rules as causal interventions, this
procedure resolves the challenge associated with the hard-
ness result of (Miller et al., 2020).
4. Prediction Risk Minimization
Low prediction risk is important in any setting where the
decision-maker wishes for a decision to accurately match
the eventual outcome. For example, consider an insurer who
wishes to price car insurance exactly in line with drivers’
expected costs of accident reimbursements. Pricing too low
would make them unprofitable, and pricing too high would
allow a competitor to undercut them.
Specifically, we want to minimize expected squared error
when predicting the true outcomes of agents, a p-fraction of
whom have gamed with respect to ω:
Risk(ω) = Ex∼P,η
[
(1− p) (ωTV x− (ω∗)Tx)2
+ p
(
ωTV xg −
(
ω∗Txg + η
))2 ] (6)
We begin by noting a useful decomposition of accuracy in a
generalized linear setting. For this result, all that we assume
about agents’ actions is that agents’ feature vectors and
actions are drawn from some joint distribution (x, a) ∼ D
such that the action effects are uncorrelated with the features:
E(x,a)∼D
[
(Ma)xT
]
= 0.
Lemma 1. Let ω be a decision rule and let a be the action
taken by agents in response to ω. Suppose that the distribu-
tions of Ma and x satisfy Ex,a
[
(Ma)xT
]
= 0. Then the
expected squared error of a decision rule ω on the gamed
distribution can be decomposed as the sum of the following
two positive terms (plus a constant offset c):
1. The risk of ω on the initial distribution
2. The expected squared error of ω in predicting the im-
pact (on agents’ outcomes) of gaming.
That is,
Risk(ω) = Ex
[(
(V ω − ω∗)Tx)2]
+ Ea
[(
(V ω − ω∗)T (Ma))2]+ c (7)
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The proof appears in the appendix.
This decomposition illustrates that minimizing prediction
risk requires balancing two competing phenomena. First,
one must minimize the risk associated with the original
(ungamed) agent distribution by rewarding features that are
correlated with outcome in the original data. Second one
must minimize error in predicting the effect of agents’ gam-
ing on their outcomes by rewarding features in accordance
with the true change in outcome. The relative importance of
these two phenomena depends on p, the fraction of agents
who game.
Unfortunately, minimizing this objective is not straightfor-
ward. Even with just squared action cost (with actions
a(ω) linear in ω), the objective becomes a non-convex quar-
tic. However, we will show that in cases where the naive
gaming-free predictor overestimates the impact of gaming,
this quartic can be minimized efficiently.
Algorithm 2 Relaxed Prediction Risk Oracle
Input: ω, n
Let Pω be the distribution of agent features and labels
(x, y) drawn when agents face decision rule ω.
Let Y (S) := 1‖S‖
∑
(x,y)∈S y.
Let Y˜ω(S) := 1‖S‖
∑
(x,y)∈S(V ω)Tx.
Collect samples Di = {(x, y) ∼ Pωi}n.
if Y˜ω(Di) > Y (Di) then
Collect new samples D′i = {(x, y) ∼ Pωi}n.
return 1n
∑
(x,y)∈D′
i
((V ωi)Tx− y)2
else
Collect6 samples D∗i =
{
(x, y) ∼ P~0
}
n
.
return 1n
∑
(x,y)∈D∗
i
((V ωi)Tx− y)2
end if
Remark 1. Let ω0 be the decision rule that minimizes the
prediction risk without gaming and let agent action costs
be C(a) = 12‖a‖22. If ω0 overestimates the change in agent
outcomes as a result of the agents’ gaming, then we can find
an approximate prediction-risk-minimizing decision rule
in k = O(poly(d)) rounds by using a derivative-free opti-
mization procedure on the convex relaxation implemented
in Algorithm 2.
Proof Sketch. To find a decision rule ω that minimizes pre-
dictive risk, we first need to define prediction risk as a
function of ω. As shown in Lemma 1, the prediction risk
Risk(ω) consists of two terms: the classic gaming-free
prediction risk (a quadratic), and the error in estimating
the effect of gaming on the outcome (the “gaming error”).
In the quadratic action cost case, this can be written out
as
(
(V ω − ω∗)T (MMTV ω))2. This overall objective is
a high-dimensional quartic, with large nonconvex regions.
Instead of optimizing this sum of a convex function and
nonconvex function, we optimize the convex function plus
a convex relaxation of the nonconvex function. Since the
minimum of the original function is in a region where the
relaxation matches the original, this allows us to find the
optimum using standard optimization machinery.
The trick is to observe that of the two terms composing the
prediction risk, the prediction risk before gaming is always
convex (it is quadratic), and the “gaming error” is a regular
quartic that is convex in a large region. Specifically, there
exists an ellipse in decision rule space separating the convex
from the (partially) non-convex regions of the “gaming error”
function, where the value of this “gaming error” on the
ellipse is exactly 0. To see why, note that there is a possible
rotation and translation of ω into a vector z such that the
quantity inside the square, (V ω − ω∗)TMMTV ω, can be
rewritten as z21 + z22 + . . .+ z2d − c, where c > 0. The zeros
of this function, and thus of the “gaming error” (which
is its square), form an ellipse. This ellipse corresponds
to the set of points where the decision rule ω perfectly
predicts the effect on outcomes of gaming induced by agents
responding to this same decision rule, meaning ω∗TMa−
ωTVMa = 0. In the interior of this ellipse, where the
decision rule underestimates the true effect of gaming on
agent outcomes (ω∗TMa > ωTVMa), the quartic is not
convex. On the other hand, on the area outside of this ellipse,
where ω∗TMa < ωTVMa, it is always convex.
ω0 minimizes the prediction risk on ungamed data, and is
thus the minimum of the quadratic first term. We are given
that ω0 overestimates the effect of gaming on the outcome
ω∗T0 Ma < ω
T
0 VMa and is thus outside the ellipse.
7 We
will now show that a global minimum lies outside the ellipse.
Assume, for contradiction, that all global minima lie inside
the ellipse. Pick any minimum ωmin. Then there must be
a point ω′ on the line between ω0 and ωmin that lies on
the ellipse. All points on the ellipse are minima (zeros) for
the “gaming error” quartic, so the second component of the
predictive risk is weakly smaller for ω′ than for ωmin. But
the value of the quadratic is also smaller for ω′ since it is
strictly closer to the minimum of the quadratic ω0. Thus
Risk(ω′) < Risk(ωmin), which is a contradiction. This
means that the objective Risk(ω) is convex in a neighbor-
hood around its global minimum, which guarantees that
optimizing this relaxation of the original objective yields
the correct result.
The remaining concern is what to do if we fall into the
ellipse, and thus potentially encounter the non-convexity
of the objective. We solve this by, in this region, replacing
the overall prediction risk objective Risk(ω) with the no-
gaming prediction risk objective (on data sampled when
ω = ~0). Geometrically, the function on this region becomes
7Note that if ω∗T0 Ma = ωT0 VMa exactly, then ω0 is a global
optimum and we are done.
Causal Strategic Linear Regression
a quadratic. The values of this quadratic perfectly match the
values of the quartic at the boundary, so the new piecewise
function is convex and continuous everywhere. In practice,
we empirically check whether the decision rule on average
underestimated the true outcome. If so, we substitute the
prediction risk with the classic gaming-free risk.
We can now give this objective oracle to a derivative-free
convex optimization procedure, which will find a deci-
sion rule with value -close to the global prediction-risk-
minimizing decision rule in a polynomial (in d, 1/) number
of rounds and samples.
This raises an interesting observation: in our scenario it is
easier to recover from an initial over-estimate of the effect
of agents’ gaming on the outcome (by reducing the weights
on over-estimated features) than it is to recover from an
under-estimate (which requires increasing the weight of
each feature by an unknown amount).
Remark 2. The procedure described in Remark 1 can
also be used to minimize a weighted sum of the outcome-
maximization and prediction-risk-minimization objectives.
This follows from the fact that the outcome-maximization
objective is linear in ω, and therefore adding it to the
prediction-risk objective preserves the convexity/concavity
of each of the different regions of the objective. Thus, if a
credit scorer wishes to find the loan decision rule that maxi-
mizes a weighted sum of their accuracy at assigning loans,
and the fraction of their customers who successfully repay
(according to some weighting), this provides a method for
doing so under certain initial conditions.
5. Parameter Estimation
Finally, we provide an algorithm for estimating the causal
outcome-generating parameters ω∗, specifically in the case
where the features are fully visible (V = I).8
Theorem 2. (Informal) Given V = I (all dimensions are
visible) and Σ + λMMT is full rank for some λ (that is,
there exist actions that will allow change in the full feature
space), we can estimate ω∗ to arbitrary precision. We do so
by computing an ω that results in more informative samples,
and then gathering samples under that ω. The procedure
requires O˜(d) rounds. See the appendix for details.)
The algorithm that achieves this result consists of the fol-
lowing steps:
1. Estimate the covariance of the initial agent feature
distribution before strategic behavior Σ by initially
8For simplicity, we also assume p = 1, though any lower
fraction of gaming agents can be accomodated by scaling the
samples per round.
not disclosing any decision rule to the agents, and
observing their features.
2. Estimate parameters of the Gramian of the action ma-
trix G = MMT by incentivizing agents to vary each
feature sequentially.
3. Use this information to learn the decision function
ω which will yield the most informative samples in
identifying ω∗, via convex optimization.
4. Use the new, more informative samples in order to run
OLS to compute an estimate of the causally precise
regression parameters ω∗.
At its core, this can be understood as running OLS after ac-
quiring a better dataset via the smartest choice of ω (which
is, perhaps surprisingly, unique). Whereas the convergence
of OLS without gaming would be controlled by the mini-
mum eigenvalue of the second moment matrix Σ, conver-
gence of our method is governed by the minimum eigen-
value of post-gaming second-moment matrix:
E[(x+Gω)(x+Gω)T ] = Σ + 2µωTGT +GωωTGT
Our method learns a value of ω that results in the above
matrix having a larger minimum eigenvalue, improving the
convergence rate of OLS. The proof and complete algorithm
description is left to the appendix.
6. Discussion
In this work, we have introduced a linear setting and tech-
niques for analyzing decision-making about strategic agents
capable of changing their outcomes. We provide algorithms
for leveraging agents’ behaviors to maximize agent out-
comes, minimize prediction risk, and recover the true pa-
rameter vector governing the outcomes. Our results suggest
that in certain settings, decision-makers would benefit by
not just being passively transparent about their decision
rules, but by actively informing strategic agents.
While these algorithms eventually yield more desirable
decision-making functions, they substantially reduce the
decision-maker’s accuracy in the short term while explo-
ration is occurring. Regret-based analysis of causal strategic
learning is a potential avenue for future work. In general,
these procedures make the most sense in scenarios with
a fairly small period of delay between decision and out-
come (e.g. predicting short-term creditworthiness rather
than long-term professional success), as at each new round
the decision-maker must wait to receive the samples gamed
according to the new rule.
Our methods also rely upon the assumption that new agents
appear every round. If there are persistent stateful agents,
as in many real-world repeated decision-making settings,
different techniques may be required.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Agent Outcomes
Proof of Theorem 1. Let’s walk through the steps of the algorithm, bounding the error that accumulates along the way.
In the first round we set ω = 0 in order to obtain an estimate for E[ω∗Tx].
Since ω∗ is a unit vector, the variance of ω∗Tx is at most λmax plus a constant (from the 1−subgaussian noise).
This means that O(−1dλmax) samples suffice for the empirical estimator of E[ω∗Tx] to have no more than 4d error with
failure probability Ω( 12d ). We call the output of this estimator µˆ and let µˆd be the r-dimensional vector with µˆ in every
coordinate.
Now we choose ω1....ωd that form an orthonormal basis of the image of the diagonal matrix V . For each ω we observe the
reward ω∗T (x+Gω) + η, subtract out µˆ, and plug it into the empirical mean estimator. For each ωi, let νˆi be the resulting
coefficient. After O(−1dλmax) samples, each coefficient has at most 4d error with failure probability at most
1
2d . Since
we have computed d + 1 estimators, each one with failure probability at most 12d , a union bound gives us a total failure
probability that is sub-constant.
We can now bound the total squared `2 error between said coefficients and GTω∗ in the ω1...ωd basis (noting that the choice
of basis does not affect the magnitude of the error). We can break up the error into two components using the triangle
inequality: the error due to µˆd and the error in the subsequent rounds. Each coordinate of µˆd has error of magnitude at
most 4d , so the total magnitude of the error in µˆd is at most

4 . The same argument applies for the error in the coordinate
estimates, leading to a total `2 error of at most /2.
Recall that ωˆ = νˆ/‖νˆ‖. Let ν := GTω∗. We can now bound the gap between the agent outcomes incentivized by ωˆ and by
ωimp = ν/ν:
AO(ωimp)−AO(ωˆ) = νT ν‖ν‖ − ν
T νˆ
‖νˆ‖ (8)
= ‖ν‖ − νT νˆ‖νˆ‖ (9)
≤ ‖ν‖ − ‖ν‖(‖ν‖ − /2)‖ν‖+ /2 (10)
= ‖ν‖‖ν‖+ /2 ≤  (11)
7.2. Prediction Risk
Proof of Lemma 1.
Risk(ω) = Ex,a
[(
ωTV (x+Ma)− ω∗T (x+Ma)
)2]
=Ex,a
[((
ωTV x− ω∗Tx
)
+
(
ωTVMa− ω∗TMa
))2]
=Ex,a
[(
ωTV x− ω∗Tx
)2]
+ Ex,a
[
(V ω − ω∗)T x(Ma)T (V ω − ω∗)
]
+ Ex,a
[(
ωTVMa− ω∗TMa
)2]
=Ex
[(
ωTV x− ω∗Tx
)2]
+ Ea
[(
ωTVMa− ω∗TMa
)2]
where the last line follows because Ma and x are uncorrelated.
7.3. Parameter Estimation
In this section we describe how we recover ωˆopt in L2-distance when there exists an ω such that Σ +Gω is full rank. Before
we proceed we make a couple of observations. When there is no way to make the above matrix full rank, we cannot hope to
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recover the optimal ωˆopt. If there is no natural variation in e.g. the last two features, and furthermore no agent can act along
those features, it is not possible to disentangle their potential effects on the outcome. This also suggests that the parameter
recovery is a more substantive demand for the decision maker than the standard linear regression setting. To discover this
additional information, the decision maker can incentivize the agents to take actions that help the decision-maker recover the
true outcome-governing parameters.
This motivates the algorithm we present in this section. It operates in two stages. First, it recovers the information necessary
in order to to identify the decision rule which will provide the most informative agent samples after those agents have gamed.
Second, it collects data while incentivizing this action. Finally, it computes an estimate of ωˆopt using the collected data. We
present the complete procedure in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Recovering the Causal Model
1: Let k1 = λmax(GTG) and k2 = ||Σ||2
2: Let κmin = λmin(Σ)
3: Choose an  > 0
4: Let n1 = O(max( dk1κmin ,
d2k2
κmin
))
5: Collect samples x1, . . . , xn1
6: Let µˆ = 1n1
∑
xi
7: Let Σˆ = 1n1
∑
xix
T
i
8: Let n2 = O(max(d2||µˆ||2tr(Σ), d3||G||2tr(Σ)))
9: for i = 1...d do
10: ω = ei
11: Sample x1, . . . , xin2 and subtract µˆ from each one.
12: Let Gˆi = 1n2
n2∑
j=1
xj
13: end for
14: Let ωˆopt = arg min
ω
Σˆ + 2µωT GˆT + GˆωωT GˆT
15: Let n3 = O( dκmin )
16: Sample x1, . . . , xn3 with ω = ωˆopt.
17: Return the output of OLS on x1, . . . , xn3
The procedure in Algorithm 3 can be summarized as follows:
1. Estimate the first and second moments of the distribution of agents’ features.
2. Estimate the Gramian of the action matrix G.
3. Compute the most informative choice of ω.
4. Collect samples under the most informative ω and then return the output of OLS.
Before we proceed to the proof of correctness of Algorithm 3, let us build some intuition for why this procedure of choosing
a single ω and collecting samples under said ω makes sense. As we show later, the convergence of OLS for linear regression
can be controlled by the minimum eigenvalue of the second moment matrix of the samples. Our algorithm finds the value of
ω that, after agents game, maximizes this minimum eigenvalue in expectation. It turns out the minimum eigenvalue of the
expected second moment matrix of post-gaming samples is convex with respect to the choice of ω. The convexity of the
objective suggests that a priori, when choosing ωs to obtain informative samples, the optimal strategy is choose a single
specific ω.
The main difficulty in the rest of the algorithm is achieving the necessary precision in the estimation to be able to set up the
above optimization problem to identify such an ω.
Theorem 3. When V = I , the output of Algorithm 3 run with parameter  satisfies ||ω − ω∗|| ≤  with probability greater
than 23 .
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The proof of Theorem 3 relies on several lemmas. First we bound the L2 error of OLS as a function of the empirical second
moment matrix in Lemma 2. Note that the usual bound for the convergence of OLS is distribution dependent. That is, the
expected error is small.
Lemma 2. Assume V = I . Consider samples x1, . . . , xn and yi = ωˆToptxi + ηi. Let ω be the output of OLS (xi, yi). Then
Eη
[||ω − ωˆopt||2] ≤ d
nκmin
The above proof is elementary and a slight modification of the standard textbook proof (see for example, (Liang, 2016)).
The proof also requires that the optimization to choose the optimal ω is convex.
Lemma 3. The minimum eigenvalue of the following matrix is convex with respect to ω for any values of x,G.∑
i
(xi + Gˆω)(xi + Gˆω)T
Furthermore, when the following conditions are true, then the minimum eigenvalue of the above is within a constant factor
of the optimal value.
E[(x+Gω)(x+ Gˆω)T ].
• ||Σˆ− Σ||2 ≤ 
• ||µ− µˆ||2 ≤ λmax(GTG)d
• ||Gˆ−G||2 ≤ d||µ||2
• ||Gˆ−G||2 ≤ d2||G||2
Finally, the above holds true even for an ω with distance at most O( 1poly(d) ) from the optimum.
Finally, we use a minor lemma for recover of a random vector via the empirical mean estimator. Note that we treat the
matrix G as a vector.
Lemma 4. Assume V = I . Let gi1, . . . , gin be drawn from the distribution Gi + ξ and Gˆ be the empirical mean estimator
computed from said gij’s. Let Σ be the expected second moment matrix of the ξs. Then
Eξ||G− Gˆ||2 ≤ d
2tr(Σ)
n
We proceed with the proof of Theorem 3 below.
Proof. The first step of the algorithm is for recovering an estimate of Σ and µ. Note that n1 samples suffice to recover Σˆ
and µˆ such that:
• ||Σˆ− Σ||2 ≤ 
• ||µ− µˆ||2 ≤ λmax(GTG)d
The for loop recovers an estimate of G. Via Lemma 4, the samples suffice to ensure that the following two conditions hold:
• ||Gˆ−G||2 ≤ d||µ||2
• ||Gˆ−G||2 ≤ d2||G||2
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Then the algorithm computes an estimate of the optimal ω. Via Lemma 3, we have that the optimum guarantees the minimum
eigenvalue of an approximate solution will be within a constant factor of the optimum.
This ω guarantees that n3 samples suffice to ensure the recover of ω∗ within squared L2-distance of O() in expectation.
Finally the expectations can be used with a Markov inequality to ensure the algorithm succeeds with (arbitrarily high)
constant probability.
Now we prove the lemmas. We begin with Lemma 2. This proof is a slight modification of the textbook proof for the
convergence of OLS.
Proof. In this section we derive a bound on the convergence of the least squares estimator when a fixed design matrix X is
used. Note this is exactly the case we encounter, since the choice of ω lets us affect the entries of the design matrix. This is a
standard, textbook result and not a main contribution of the paper.
In order to state the result more formally we have to introduce some notation. The goal of the procedure is to recover ωˆopt,
when given tuples (xi, ωˆoptxi + η) where η is 1-subgaussian. We aim to characterize ||ω − ωˆopt|| where ω is obtained from
ordinary least squares. Let X be the vector with the xi’s in its columns. Let κmin be the minimum eigenvalue of 1nX
TX
(the second moment matrix).
Below all expectations are taken only over the random noise. We assume the second moment matrix is full rank.
E[||ω − ωˆopt||2] ≤ E[ 1
nκmin
(ω − ωˆopt)XTX(ω − ωˆopt)]
= E[ 1
nκmin
||X(ω − ωˆopt)||2]
= 1
nκmin
E[||X(XTX)−1XT (Xωˆopt + η)−Xωˆopt||2]
= 1
nκmin
E[||X(XTX)−1XT η||2]
≤ d
nκmin
This motivates our procedure for parameter recovery. We do so in a fashion that attempts to maximize κmin. Note that it is
the minimum eigenvalue that determines the convergence rate. This is due to the fact that little variation along a dimension
makes it hard to disentangle the features’ effect on the outcome via ωˆopt from the constant-variance noise η.
Lemma 3 is somewhat more involved. It is proven in three parts. The first is that the optimization problem is convex. The
second is that approximate recovery of S, µ, and G suffice for approximately minimizing the original expression. The third
is that an approximate solution suffices.
Proof. In this section we describe how to choose the value of ω that maximizes the value of κmin for the samples we obtain.
To do so, we examine the expectation of the second moment matrix and make several observations. Let Σ denote the
expected second moment matrix of x (i.e. E[xxT ]. We have:
E[(x+Gω)(x+Gω)T ] = Σ + 2µωTGT +GωωTGT
1. The minimum eigenvalue of the above expression is concave with respect to ω. This follows due to the following:
x+Gω is a linear operator, the minimum eigenvalue of a Gramian matrix XTX is concave with respect to X , and the
expectation of a concave function is concave (Boyd & Vandenberghe, 2004).
2. Since the agent attempts to maximize their motion in the ω direction, we want to ensure that we move them toward
toward the direction that maximizes the minimum eigenvalue of E[(x+Gω)(x+Gω)T ].
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However, we do not operate with exact knowledge of G, etc. It turns out that even approximately solving this optimization
problem with estimates for G,Σ, µ suffices for our purposes, as long as the ω we obtain from our optimization (using the
estimates) results in a high value for the minimum eigenvalue of E[(x+Gω)(x+Gω)T ]. Let ωˆ be the maximizing argument
for the estimated optimization problem and let ω be the maximizing argument for the original optimization problem. Let
Q be the true maximized second moment matrix including gaming, and Qˆ be the maximizing second moment matrix
with gaming resulting from replacing the true Σ, µ,G with the estimates. In formal terms, we need to show the minimum
eigenvalue of the following is large: E[(x+Gωˆ)(x+Gωˆ)T ]. We note that when yT Qˆy is within  of yTQy for all y in the
unit ball, the minimum eigenvalues may differ by at most .
||yT Qˆy − yTQy||2 = ||yT (Qˆ−Q)y||2
≤ λ2max(Qˆ−Q)(y)||y||2
≤ ||Qˆ−Q||2
And now we bound the norm of ||Σˆ− Σ||2 assuming the following:
1. ||Σˆ− Σ||2 ≤ 
2. ||µ− µˆ||2 ≤ λmax(GTG)d
3. ||Gˆ−G||2 ≤ d||µ||2
4. ||Gˆ−G||2 ≤ d2||G||2
We work out the bound below.
||Qˆ−Q||2 = ||Σ + 2µωˆToptGT +GωˆoptωˆToptGT − (Σˆ + 2µˆωT GˆT + GˆωˆoptωoptT GˆT )||2
≤ ||Σ− Σˆ||2 + 2||µωˆToptGT − µˆωˆToptGˆT ||2 + || . . . ||2
≤ + 2||µωˆToptGT + µˆωˆoptTGT − µˆωˆoptTGT − µˆωˆToptGˆT ||2 + || . . . ||2
≤ + d||µ− µˆ||2||ωˆToptG||2 + ||Gˆ−G||2||µˆωT ||2 + . . .
≤ + + ||Gˆ−G||2||µˆωT + µωT − µωT ||2 + . . .
≤ + + ||Gˆ−G||2(||µˆ− µ||2 + ||µωˆTopt||) + . . .
≤ + + ||Gˆ−G||2d||µ||2 + . . .
≤ 3+ ||GˆωˆoptωˆToptGˆT −GωˆoptωˆToptGT ||2
≤ 3+ ||GˆωˆoptωˆToptGˆT − GˆωˆoptωˆToptG+ GˆωˆoptωˆToptG−GωˆoptωˆToptGT ||2
≤ 3+ ||(Gˆ−G)ωˆoptωˆToptGˆT ||2 + ||(Gˆ−G)ωˆoptωˆToptGT ||2
≤ 3+ ||(Gˆ−G)ωˆoptωˆToptGˆT − (Gˆ−G)ωˆoptωˆToptGT + (Gˆ−G)ωˆoptωˆToptGT ||2 + d2||Gˆ−G||2||G||2
≤ 4+ ||(Gˆ−G)ωˆoptωˆTopt(Gˆ−G)||2 + ||(Gˆ−G)ωˆoptωˆToptGT ||2
≤ 5+ d2||Gˆ−G||4
≤ 6
This means if we find an −approximate solution to the system with the estimated values, we obtain a κmin within 6 of the
optimal.
Finally, we present the proof of Lemma 4:
Proof. Recall that when the decision-maker fixes ω, it receives samples of the form x+Gω. We note this can be used to
recover the matrix G. In particular, we show how d rounds, each with O(dtr(Σ) ) samples, suffices to recover the matrix to
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squared Frobenius norm . Recall the procedure we propose simply chooses ω = e1, ...ed, one-hot coordinate vectors in
each round. We first bound the error in Gˆ. coordinate-wise: E[||Gˆi,j −Gi,j ||2] ≤ E[x
2
i ]
n . A union bound across coordinates
shows that O(d
2tr(Σ)
 ) samples suffice to recover G within squared Frobenius norm .
